Battles of the isonzo results6/25/2023 Therefore, the Italian Army in 1915 was especially strong in manpower (more than 1,000,000 men at the front), but weak in heavy weapons and special equipment. Only the field and mountain artillery were of an adequate number (1,756), while there was such a shortage of Model 1891 Italian 6.5 millimeter caliber rifles, that it was necessary to retrieve, old weapons, Model 1887 Vetterly Italian 10.35 millimeter caliber rifle from the depots. Thus, the Royal Army entered the war with a small number of machine guns (about 600), few medium and large calibre cannons (322 pieces), not many artillery shells, and an air fleet composed of a few tens of aircraft. ĭuring the ten months of neutrality, the Italian Army was not able to resolve its deficiencies, especially in terms of weapons and equipment, partly due to the limited financial resources destined for the armed forces in peacetime, in comparison to those of the major European powers. Against this danger, Cadorna deployed an entire army, with primarily defensive tasks, as an offensive in that direction would have been ill-advised both because of the mountainous terrain and the strong development of the permanent defensive structures built by the Austro-Hungarians. In fact, the Trentino salient was the weak point of the Italian line, which, wedged between Lombardy and Veneto just a few kilometres from the Po Valley, was a constant threat to the bulk of the Italian Army stationed in Friuli and therefore threatened with being outflanked. Smaller-scale offensive actions were planned in Cadore and Carnia whose purpose was to sever one of the two main rail arteries that connected Trentino to the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, beyond the Isonzo lay the most important strategic goals, such as Trieste, Ljubljana and the prospect of Vienna. The Isonzo was the traditional eastern gateway for invading Italy, where the hilly Karst plateau offered greater room for manoeuvring than other border areas with medium and high mountains. The plan, which remained essentially unchanged until May 1915, provided for the main effort to be directed towards the river Isonzo. It was only in August-September 1914, following the declaration of Italian neutrality, that the Chief of Staff Luigi Cadorna (1850-1928) issued the first guidelines for offensive action against Austria-Hungary. Respect for the alliance with the Central Powers and the clear inferiority compared to Habsburg military power led the Royal Army to limit their planning, as regards to Austria-Hungary, exclusively to initial operations of a defensive nature, apart from short-range surprise actions across the border, aimed at disturbing the assembling of the Habsburg Army. From 1882, the year of accession to the Triple Alliance, until 1914, the General Staff of the Italian Army avoided considering plans for offensive action against Austria-Hungary.
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